A recent UN monitoring report on Afghanistan contains rare acknowledgement — bordering on praise — of the Taliban’s approach to governance issues, such as the relative stability brought on by their consolidation of power, elimination of petty corruption and efforts to eradicate poppy cultivations.

In addition, the 15th report of the ISIL (Daesh) and Al Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team — submitted to the UN Security Council earlier this month — admits that the security situation in Afghanistan has improved over the past 12 months to become relatively stable.

However, the report still terms the so-called Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) the “greatest internal threat to the authority of the Taliban”.

It notes that while the Taliban “continue to transition from insurgency to governing authority”, how far they are down this road, and the extent to which they have been willing to adapt their policies to the demands of governance at the national and international levels, remain key questions.

But while the report notes that international actors had “some pragmatic engagement” with Taliban authorities on matters of mutual interest, it pointed out “the policies and behaviours of the Taliban continue to leave neighbouring states with a long list of concerns”.

“Positive consequences” of the Taliban’s consolidation of power include “improved peace and stability (though conflicts remain, active hostilities have largely stopped), significant reductions in petty corruption and opium poppy cultivation, the provision of some public services, and a weak economy that has not failed”.

The Taliban have effectively enhanced revenue collection. Funds from customs, tariffs on cross-border trade and taxes are routinely collected and deposited into the government’s single account and budgeted for expenses by the de facto finance ministry, the report states.

Development works, too, have come under increased focus.

Most significantly, perhaps, the Taliban authorities are said to have reduced petty corruption at the administrative level (such as road tolls imposed by local groups and police extortion), but the report states that corruption continues in the upper echelons.

The monitoring team also credits the Taliban with taking significant steps to eradicate drug production following the April 2022 decree banning both the cultivation and trade of opium.

But even this seems dictated by the Taliban’s internal politics. The report notes that efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation, destroy laboratories and seize chemicals “favour the Taliban establishment, serving to consolidate control of Kandahar tribes by providing Noorzai and Ishaqzai cartels with significant revenue while targeting non-Taliban rivals.”

For instance, the governor of Nangarhar controls the eastern route, while the governor of Balkh — a relative of Taliban emir Hibatullah Akhundzada — administers the northern route. Numerous figures are also involved with and profit from a continued drug trade, while the Haqqani Network maintains long-established middlemen to promote their interests in heroin trafficking and the more profitable methamphetamine market.

Akhundzada’s consolidation

According to the report, Akhundzada has reduced the gaps between Kandahar and Kabul and has secured Taliban unity in the past year.

Nevertheless, it says, divisions and tensions continue along well-established lines related to ethnicity, geography and factional loyalty, rather than over policy.

In addition, access to the emir remains carefully controlled and his personal protection force has been strengthened in the past year.

He has also extended and reshaped the influence and reach of the provincial ulema councils to guarantee a direct reporting line to the emir, while recognising that this does not amount to absolute control. He is also said to have inserted loyal men into senior positions in line ministries in Kabul in order to monitor activity and ensure compliance with his will.

However, this is also noted to be “the cause of continued tensions within the Taliban leadership, between the clerical and tribal circle close to Akhundzada and some of those loyally trying to deliver security and public services, develop the Afghan economy and build international relationships”.

Akhundzada is said to have achieved this position through a broad range of measures, including a constant shuffling of senior and mid-ranking positions, with loyalty to himself being a key criterion.

This means that key figures perceived to have been rivals of the emir – such as Mullah Omar’s son Mullah Yaqoob and interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani – had no option but to accept Akhundzada’s placemen within their ministries, although some senior Taliban figures continue to publicly criticise his policies.

“There seems to be vanishingly little room for loyal disagreement. The workings of Akhundzada’s inner circle in Kandahar remain opaque,” the report notes.

The establishment of a ‘Purging Commission’ and the Commission for the Collection of Arms and Military Equipment as tools of authority and control means the emir can monitor and ensure loyalty and compliance from senior figures

The stated purpose of the Commission was to curb nepotism within the ranks of the security forces and allow Taliban fighters who served during the insurgency access to certain state benefits and official employment, the report says. However, it notes that the implementation has led to a backlash by those who feel that their loyalty is being questioned by the Taliban administration.

Talking about the tensions within Taliban ranks, the report refers to ethnic groupings along tribal and political lines. “For example, a growing sense that individuals who are close to Hibatullah in some way regularly achieve preferment over others. Loyalty to, and alignment with, Hibatullah is now the defining factor in intra-Taliban tensions,” the report states.

Source: DAWN 

BDST: 1434 HRS, JULY 13, 2024
MN